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The shortcoming of this definition is obvious. Although the main social sciences include anthropology, economics, political science, psychology and sociology, there is also a group of social sciences that study culture (cultural anthropology, media studies, cultural studies, cinema studies, etc). According to their subject, the social sciences are sometimes defined as academic disciplines concerned with society and the relationships among individuals within a society. At times they can be very broad -academic disciplines concerned with human aspects of the world.
The latter description is very similar to the definition of the humanities, isn't it?
Another widely accepted demarcation line between the humanities and social sciences concerns not their subject, but method. It is accepted that the humanities use methods that are primarily critical, or speculative, and have a significant historical element. It is here that they differ from the natural sciences, which predominantly use empirical methods. It is thought that social scientists use methods resembling those of the natural sciences as tools for understanding society, and so represent science in its stricter modern sense. However, this distinction is also ambiguous. Firstly, it is rather strange that the difference between the humanities and social sciences is defined according to their relation to an 'other' -the natural sciences. Secondly, there are a good number of approaches within the social sciences that rely on interpretative methods of social critique or symbolic interpretation. In modern academic practice, researchers are often eclectic, using multiple methodologies (for instance, by combining quantitative and qualitative techniques).
It is remarkable that nearly all new disciplines concerned with humankind which emerged in the second half of the 20 th century -communication studies, cultural studies, education, environment, human geography, international relations, internet, linguistics, media, social work -have been identified as social sciences. This identification in itself reveals a desire to be accepted into the corpus of social sciences, not the humanities; and, accordingly, to have theoretical and methodical claims as a 'hard' science. However, it is easy to deduce that the practitioners of these disciplines mostly rely on interpretative methods.
The formation of academic disciplines took a long time. The 'liberal arts' of the Middle Ages 6 and the original division of university corporations into faculties 7 , the specialization of humanistic studies 8 and the notion of disciplina (which did not initially have clear scholarly connotations 9 ), as well as numerous ways of classifying knowledge, of inventing and re- Scientific disciplines were formed within the framework of the so-called 'second scientific revolution' in universities because of the system of specialization, workshops and laboratories 12 .
Germany was the leader in this process, although for Britain the marker of disciplinary division was the emergence of university departments in the early 19th century (apart from traditional colleges and faculties). In France, it was the work of academies and specialized schools of higher education. In the 19th century the transition from general knowledge of humankind to human sciences was complete; it included the processes of specialization and professionalization. Lorain
Duston has shown that professionalization and specialization in British, French and German academia took different forms but everywhere these processes led to the institutionalization of the humanities and social sciences 13 . In the early 20th century academic disciplines turned into Acquiring theoretical and methodological autonomy in the sciences took a long time and even in the 1930s most social disciplines still were at the stage of formation (these disciplines, like sociology, were living through infancy, according to Bloch 19 ) and the founders of the Annales School deferred not to social sciences but to natural sciences. Above all they were impressed by the discoveries in the field of physics. An important consequence of this situation was the relative equality in the relations between the representatives of social sciences, including history (this is the underlying principle of "historical synthesis" proposed by Henri Berr). Still the lesser prestige of the social sciences, lack of awareness of their achievements or underrating of these achievements yielded a very important result. In the first half of the 20 th century historians had much higher claims to producing their own theories. For example, the "old" social and Reinghardt Koselleck's Begriffsgeschichte (1979) . 'The strategy of borrowing' implies that history can naturally rely on the theoretical apparatus of the social sciences that deal with the present time. Since the 1960s, historiography has changed rapidly as the following model of interaction became established: a social science -a corresponding historical subdiscipline -the choice of macro-(and later also micro-) theory -and its application to historical material. This model overturned the relationship between history and social science that existed in the Positivist paradigm. While in the 19th century historians were supposed to provide empirical material for the social sciences to develop their theories, now, on the contrary, the social sciences supply theoretical concepts for history.
Since the 1960s, historians have reacted quickly to new developments in the social sciences. For example, the theory of modernization and world-systems analysis were promptly taken up by historians as was a concept of symbolic power. Historians in the last half of the 20 th century were quick to take on board some theories of modern social and cultural anthropology.
The same can be said about the "linguistic turn" in historiography. Today we have many interesting examples of micro-history being modeled on micro-sociology and micro-economics through the use of corresponding concepts The conceptual and theoretical apparatus of the social sciences is applied in a variety of ways, for example in the works of Giovanni Levi devoted to economic and social history and to the discussion of the theoretical problems of microanalysis.
In that sense, the work of the Italian historian is highly representative. taken into consideration -the citation of strong theories usually begins later and continues when these are already losing popularity in adjacent disciplines.
What happens if a historian bases his/her research on a theory developed for another discipline which has other ways of working with subjects existing in the present? Examples from a number of historical sub-disciplines could be offered to answer this question.
Social Theories and Methods of the Humanities
The borrowing of social theories and concepts was easily mastered by historians, but borrowing social theories was not accompanied by the adoption of prescribed methods. Thus it absorbed and successively reflected many historiographical turns and used a wide range of relevant theories in their dynamics.
My favourite example is 'Cockerels and cats' -one day I will write an article with such a title. Following the famous cultural anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, historians tried to imply the number of half-starved cats, administered sacrament to them, and hung them, the printers wanted to ridicule the legal and social system of their world' 31 .
The key word here is the word "perhaps".
If one takes into consideration volume, depth and accuracy of information and the persuasiveness of conclusions, Darnton certainly loses to Geertz, and thus thick description in history loses to thick description in cultural anthropology. The reason is that a thick description by a historian could not have been based on participant observation, but implied work with sources that were scarce and mostly were not directly related to the described incident. The past of 'other' communities cannot be explained by methods applied by cultural anthropology to 'other' cultures, simply because it is not possible either to observe, or even to fill in gaps in the documents. If, however, one is 'to follow the idea to the end' and to evaluate the chances of using theories of cultural interpretation in historical studies, one would have to admit that turning to cultural interpretation broadens both the topical scale and the limits of the source analysis.
Thanks to invasion of cultural anthropology, history has demonstrated the colossal potential for bringing in new data ("sources") in historical parlance, and teasing out totally new information from the sources previously used. As a result, the imagination and assumptions of historians, which are acceptable methods in the humanities, enable us to gain knowledge that is impossible to get using methods that are more 'precise'. This is an important value of the humanities. inner dialogue when we interact with others. If we are to understand the cause of action or an event, we need to concentrate on human thinking and reflection. The past influences our actions because we think about it and turn to it to define the current situation.
The theory of symbolic interactionism can be used successfully to study such problems in the past as social communities, collective action, social movements, emotions, and deviant behaviour. This theory offers the most important heuristic perspective for the study of the past of the communities with high level of self-comment and reflection (intellectuals, artists, scholars).
Up to now historians have used interpretative possibilities of symbolic interactionism insufficiently (in two senses: infrequently and superficially). Reasons for this again stem from the evident break in research methods between social scientists and historians. While using the theory of 'symbolic interactionism' a historian faces a situation where it is not possible to apply their instruments to historical material directly. One has to adopt the methods of historical study to this theory, to search for the replacement of 'participant observation', to deduct the processes of social interaction and individual reflection from existing sources and through these to understand 'why people did what they did', and how social meanings were produced, that is, to operate in the humanities territory.
In addition to the lag between theoretical frame and specific methods, the strategy of appropriation social science theories carries an often real threat of anachronisms due to the use of theories geared to the functioning of one type of society or one period of time to study societies of a different type/time. Such anachronisms have been observed in various fields. As a result, many historians who tried to combine the theoretical models of the social sciences and timetested methods of work with historical material came to grief (like a number of sociologists who promoted macro-theories of historical sociology to study past societies). Some innovative sections of history , which initially produced quite impressive results, later faced the problem of the limits of applicability of theories created to explain modern society to societies of the past.
On the whole, it seemed that very few social theories could be successfully applied to the study of past societies, because to perceive them one needs to employ the explicatory mechanisms of the humanities, and not of social sciences 33 .
The Use of the Humanities
The sustainable humanitarian component, whether it is explicit or implicit, does not seem to me an internal affair of history per se. Further I will focus on some cognitive benefits of belonging to the humanities.
1. One of the values of the humanities is in the fact that they still provide a rich source of vague ideas, which, due to their 'vagueness' easily find place for themselves in various disciplines. Despite losing the hope for the unity of social knowledge in the 20 th century, the shared field of ideas and fundamental concepts remain, and the humanities still produce a considerable amount of vague ideas, which have powerful heuristic potential (Die Sattelzeit, longue durée, the Carnival, archaeology of knowledge, la mort de l'auteur, etc). The more vague a theory is, the more popular and successful it could become. The unexpected attractiveness of grande idee, which temporarily pushes out all other ideas, is determined, says Susanne Langer,
by the fact that they resolve so many fundamental problems at once that they seem also to promise that they will resolve all fundamental problems, clarify all obscure issues. Everyone snaps them up as the open sesame of some new positive science, the conceptual center-point around which a comprehensive system of analysis can be built. The sudden vogue of such a grande idee, crowding out almost everything else for a while, is due, she says, 'to the fact that all sensitive and active minds turn at once to exploiting it. We try it in every connection, for every purpose, experiment with possible stretches of its strict meaning, with generalizations and derivatives' 34 .
Vague ideas are 'commonly used' and their life cycle sometimes is very long; for example, a number of intuitions of Walter Benjamin are still in demand. These are presented in a manner described by Susan Sontag in the following way:
'His phrases are not born in a way we are used to: one does not follow from the other. Any phrase emerges as the first -and the last one. ('A writer should finish every sentence with full stop and begin anew' -says the introduction to 'the Origin of German Baroque Drama'). The movement of thought and history is enfolded as a panorama of ideas, all points are taken to their extremes, and intellectual perspectives are mind-blowing' 35 .
Moreover, the flexibility of the humanities often leads to metaphorization of even highly formalized concepts of the social sciences and expands the field of their application (such was the fate of concepts like path dependence, thick description, symbolic interactionism, symbolic power, agency, and many others). Benjamin or Foucault were not threatened by metaphorization -they were the creators of metaphors.
Susanne Langer wrote that some ideas spread among intellectuals with a surprising ease.
These ideas solve so many fundamental problems that they are taken up, viewed as a key to a new, promising science, a conceptual centre to build a comprehensive system of analysis around it.
'After we have become familiar with the new idea, however, after it has become part of our general stock of theoretical concepts, our expectations are brought more into balance with its actual uses, and its excessive popularity is ended. A few zealots persist in the old key-to-theuniverse view of it; but less driven thinkers settle down after a while to the problems the idea has really generated. They try to apply it and extend it where it applies and where it is capable of extension; and they desist where it does not apply or cannot be extended' 36 .
Thus, a theory gains the status of a programmatic idea and finds a permanent place in our intellectual arsenal (if it ever had any true potential, that is). But it loses the grand, all-embracing scale and limitless perspectives of application that it had initially.
2. The realization of the limits of social sciences' explanatory power has strengthened the cognitive status of the humanities and provoked a linguistic turn in social sciences 37 . One more radical innovation is remarkable in the context of our topic, in my opinion. It is found in a number of social disciplines, and it reveals the imperialism of history that seemed to disappear a long time ago. One witnesses a new stage in the historisation of sciences (not only social ones) that presents itself in the active use of the neo-Darwinist evolutionary theory 38 , biological or cognitive turn in anthropology 39 , the successes of evolutionary economics 40 , historical aspect of ecology 41 . Here we do not talk about the direct influence of the humanities but rather about the attractiveness of their historicity.
Now we clearly deal with the temporalisation of some very different disciplinary discourses. I would address some processes taking place in the social sciences closest to history:
in anthropology and sociology. I refer to the further deepening of history (in a direct sense: for millions and millions of years) in historical anthropology (this phenomenon was called the "biological" or "cognitive" turn) 42 and to the so-called "third wave" 43 in historical sociology. The "third wave" of historical sociology surprises by its historicism and the desire to explain the complex web of numerous factors, wishes, events, turning points, "historical traps", etc. with unexpected consequences even in retrospect, which is so typical to the humanities approach. It does not result in the creation of a typology, but rather in the establishment of a chain of events and complicated cause-and-effect relations unique for each historical tendency.
3. Historicist re-orientation and complication of contemporary analytical instruments also suggests turning to cognitive sets and structures of social self-reflection and self-representation that were produced, for example, in the 17 th century, or in the period of Romaniticism. The sets of past scientific and social ideas are not just a pre-history of thought that can be taken out, they remain relevant outside of their own epochs. This is certainly true of the demand in the 20 th and early 21 st centuries for classical methodological and philosophical works of the early Modern period (by Descartes, Vico, or Hobbes).
If we take into account the above, we can recognize that the impossibility of using social science methods has a positive value; it ensures resistibility of the humanities and enables the preservation of the disciplinary core. When it is not possible to use the methods of social sciences, theories 'soften' and this gives a different cognitive perspective. Using methods specific to the humanities it is possible to catch things more ephemeral than trends, patterns, mechanisms and statistical rules.
'Through the humanities we reflect on the fundamental question: What does it mean to be human? The humanities offer clues but never a complete answer. They reveal how people have tried to make moral, spiritual, and intellectual sense of a world where irrationality, despair, loneliness, and death are as conspicuous as birth, friendship, hope, and reason' 44 .
It should be said that by the end of the last century, the euphoria regarding the unlimited possibilities of universal laws, historical synthesis, mathematical methods, powerful theories, etc.
has diminished not only in the humanities, but also in the social sciences. The matter is that the humanities deal with meanings (texts of various kinds), and social sciences with processes, institutions, mechanisms, etc. Working with meanings typical for the humanities does not suggest the rejection of a scientific approach, at least, if one is to apply the accepted definition of scientificity: 'true scientific analysis has to correlate with facts, meet the requirement of simplicity and to have an explanative power' 45 . Macro-concepts of social sciences do not answer the questions of ultimate meaning, while the humanities try to do so. I refer not only to secular humanism. The mystery of the humanities is in its 'softness', which they cannot be rid of, and which does not show their weakness or immaturity, but rather their quite different heuristic potential.
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